Stalin and the Korean War

Stalin and the Korean state of state of warTo what bound was Stalins policy the principle cause of the Korean warfare (1950-53)? ingress The Korean state of war is often referred to as a battle mingled with communism and capitalism. It succeeded the end of the forty-year Japanese origin of Korea. When Japan fell during the succor World war, Korea was free, and intrustd to finally decide the fate of their own country. In the years following, twain radical and nationalist groups became appargonnt, aiming for independence, only these groups failed to unite in bingle national ingrainment.1 The majority of Koreans fought for a unified state.2 The coupled States and the Soviet wedding, however, had preference designs. The hot seat of the joined States, hassle S. Truman, treasured to stop Russia gathering any longer territory3, at that placefore the unite States countered by encouraging the establishment of democracy.4 At the Potsdam conference, in Germany, Korea w as change integrity at the 38th parallel mingled with the uniting and the S surfaceh. The purpose was that southwestern Korea would be capitalist and unification Korea would be commieic. The democracy of Korea (ROK) was set-up in the South and led by Syngman Rhee who was undemocratic and anti-communist but was recognized as the sole legal g everywherenment of Korea.5 The Democratic mints Republic of Korea (DPRK) was set-up in the North and led by communist Kim Il-Sung. There was hope that top-notchstar day the unification of Korea would commence.6 The Korean contend isone that killed over 2.5 million people.7 Theconditions of the Korean strugglef are were inconsistent Korea is a country with freezing snowy winters and boiling hot summers, which made conflict extremely tall(prenominal) on twain sides. The war began at 430 AM on June 25, 1950 and lasted for three straight years,the bipolar weather conditions meant that the soldiers were constantly fleckdisease, malnut rition and frostbite.8Dean Acheson (1893-1971), the U.S. Secretary of State, once s uphold that if thebest minds in the populace had set out to find us the worst possible localization principle inthe world to fight this damnable war, the unanimous choice would spend a penny beenKorea.9The disaster to unite Korea after WWII was an im appearanceant f get alongor in the firstof the Korean contend. In 1945, BritishPrime Minister Winston Churchill, U.S. President Harry Truman, and, Soviet slide byer Joseph Stalin, gathered in Potsdam,Germany, from July 17 to wonderful 2. It was hold to temporarily divideKorea and accept joint responsibility for reinstating Japanese forces. They indomitable upon anessentially arbitrary line which was the 38th reduplicate which was to be utilise asa disagreement between the North and South. The 38th Parallel is acircle of latitude which is 38 degrees north of the equator, it happened toroughly divided Korea in the middle, thusly was chosen to d ivide the twoKoreas. The Role of StalinWhen Kim lenient his frustration that his bid for reunification remained heavy on his mind, he reached out to both Joseph Stalin (the leader of the Soviet northern) and monoamine oxidase Zedong (the chairman of the communist troupe of mainland mainland chinaware). The definite reason for Stalin giving Kim permission to invade South is ambiguous to this day. Either the victory of communistic mainland China, or the Soviets gain of the atomic flop could defend led to Stalins decision being made.10 One of Stalins main aims was to avoid conflict with the joined States, he did this in many modes, one of which was denying Kims strategies for the war. The withdrawal of American troops from South Korea were significant, however, Stalin was under(a) the impression that a harsh military campaign wouldnt go unanswered, hence he decided against refutation in the moment11. Stalin had promised both ethnical and economical back up to North Korea, during a meeting between Stalin, Kim, and representatives from both governments, on walk 5, 1949. Regarding military trading operations across the 38th parallel, Stalin was not yet prepared to co-occurrence Kims political and strategic objectives of reunification.12 Stalin brought Kim to capital of the Russian Federation to ensure that Korea did not fall under the influence of the new Peoples Republic of China (PRC).13 According to Stalins interpreter, in the bounds of 1949, in the course of a meeting between Kim and Stalin, Kim complained that the southerners are qualification trouble all the time. They are violating the border there are never-ending small clashes. Stalin became gloomy What are you talking virtually? Are you brusk of arms? We shall give them to you. You must strike the southerners in the teeth. After thinking for a while, he repeated, Strike them, strike them.14 This extract from the meeting reinforces the menstruum that Stalin was providing North Korea with weapons and supplies, which demonstrates that the Korean fight wouldnt have occurred without the help from Stalin and The Soviet Union. Stalin decidedthat he needed to bring Korea into the Soviet sphere of influence. The Sovietswanted to expand the sphere of communist influence into Korea, this was becauseStalin and the Soviet Union wanted to be surrounded by communist countries as a forge of protection for Russia and so if the threat of invasion or war occurredthey would have support around them. Stalin was afraid that Mao was consideringopening China to capitalist influence therefore, he decided that he could notallow North Korea to do the same.15Throughout the spring and summer of 1949 that Kim was making significantstrides to plus the potency of the KPA (Korean peoples army). Stalin wasessentially only interested in how the Korean War would affect his relationswith the get together States16. On folk 3rd, 1949, Kim sought permission from Stalin and theSoviet Union to comm ence military operations against the south.17Kim most potential believed that Korea would be next in line for the Asiaticcommunist movements thus in early 1950, Kim renewed his requests for militaryreunification with Stalin18.In January 1950, the first Soviet Ambassador to North Korea, Terentii Shtykov,feared that Kim was looking to move forward toward reunification withoutapproval from Stalin, so he sent a telegram with a forlorn warning KimIl-sung is constantly nurturing his opinion about an attack.19 In 1950 Stalin eventually began tosupport the designs for a war as at this point he was more hopeful about winning.The Communist victory in China and the development of the USSRs first atomicbomb persuaded Stalin to act and help North Korea.TheUSSR was utilise the Korean war as aproxy war, a war instigated by a major cater which does not itself become carryd. The Role of Truman At the Council of impertinent Ministers Moscow crowd, in December 1945, the USA and the Soviet Union agreed to create a temporary government in Korea that would lead to independence20. However, independence was never achieved and the rimed War developed individuals of higher power who became less willing to co-operate. tell apart governments emerged on both sides of Korea. Both Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee fought the Japanese during the occupation and wanted to end the division of Korea, however they had different ideas for how to do so. The failure of uniting the two Koreas led to the permanent governments of Korea. The USA was also using the Korean War as a proxy war. The Americans enforced the idea of containment, a foreign policy used to contain the spread of communism. The US was fearful that if a united Korea became communist if would lead to a eye mask effect and the spread of communism around the world would occur21. Truman feared that the next domino would be Japan22. The possible reaction from Stalin had to be taken into consideration if the U.S. did involve themselv es in the Korean War. On a similar note, the Truman administration was come to of the possible expansion of the Korean War into a larger war taking place over Europe.23 Nevertheless, it was clear that there was little property that the United States or even the United Nations could shy from the war.24 It is thought that the US and UN feared what would happen if North Korea won the war and subsequently Kim Il-Sung came to power, with the support of Stalinist regime and the Soviet Union. President Truman believed if the aggression from North Korea went unnoticed, it would encourage Communist aggression elsewhere.25 The UN Security Council accepted the abuse of force to aid the South Koreans. This is noteworthy because Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) is one of the permanent seats upon the UN council, however, interestingly, the Soviet Union did not oppose the use of force against North Korea, even though the Soviet Union were responsible for displace troops and supplies into the war. This demonstrates that the Soviet Union were confident in the ability of their troops, so confident that in detail they did not fear the force that would be against them. The Truman administration, however, continued to restrict themselves from ventilateing soldiers because according to their advisors, North Koreans could be stopped by purely both oceanic and air power. Subsequently, immediately upon hearing this news, the U.S. began utilizing whatever air and naval forces that they could, to help with the war.26 Following Chinas input into the Korean War, general MacArthur landed two divisions 150 miles in the South Korean port of Inchon. Following a seize of communication between them and the US, the North Koreans are reported to have fled North, escaping27. If we let Korea down, Truman said, the Soviets will keep right on going and swallow up one place after another.28 General Douglas MacArthur, mind of staff of the United States Army, believed that only a total victory was an welcome outcome for the US. President Truman disagreed but MacArthur was adamant.29The Role of Mao Unlike America, China decided to take apassive response during the initial constitute of the Korean War.30The Peoples Republic of China, in October 1950, was only one year old. TheBeijing regime was already facing difficult tasks of economic reconstructionand regime consolidation.31Therefore it was predicted that China would have little to no interference inthe Korean War. There is some evidence that suggests that there was an exchangeof views between Kim, Mao Zedong and Stalin on the Norths plan of militaryinvasion.32However, besides giving Kim moral support, only material support was providedby China at beginning of the war. They sent approximately 14,000 Korean Chinesesoldiers who were then serving in the Peoples Liberation Army bottom to Korea.33Maos reasons for supporting North Koreas invasion of the South are oftendebated. Some believe that Mao was an unwilling particip ant in the war due tothe concerns about the effect it would have on China34.Mao feared that if he supported North Korea it would have a negative encounter onChina as it could trigger an invasion from America, due to their aid for theSouth. Some others further argue that Mao was in some way manipulated orcompelled into sending troops to North Korea by Stalin and Kim-Il-Sung.35On June 27, President Truman revealed that America was supplying South Koreawith air and naval support, which lead to the Chinese leaders reassessingAmerican intentions towards China and redeploy some of its troops to the Yankee border.36Mao asked if Stalin would send air support to North Korea and he would sendtroops. Stalin decided against sending air support. Mao, after a substantial number of thought, sent Chinese troops into Korea on 19 October 1950, eventhough he was currently dealing with a difficult military point himself37.This fundamentally changed the relationshipbetween China and the Soviet Union f orever. scarce12 days after the Chinese troops had enrolled in the war, Stalin concisely declaredthat the Soviet Air contract could provide air cover, and aid to China38, due to North Korean assistance from China. The Sino-Soviet Treaty ofFriendship, which was signed in February 1950, mentioned that all-out supportwould be supplied by the Soviet Union if China was entangled in any military conflictwith the imperialist countries.39This conformity ensured that if China intervened in the Korean War, there would beless of a threat from an American invasion because of the support from Stalinand the Soviets. The security treaty therefore significantly decreased thepossibility of an American invasion. The Communist China company (CCP) had aMarxist-Leninism ideology that greatly influenced the decisions of seniormembers, especially Mao40.Presumably, it was this ideology that lead them to assist North Korea in thewar, because turning the whole of Korea into a communist country would be no tonly be beneficial to Russia and the Soviet Union, it would also benefit Maoand the CCP.The Role of Kim Il-SungIn September 1948, the North founded the DemocraticPeoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), founded by Kim Il Sung, recognized as thecommunist side. Kim IlSung was the leader of North Korea from 1948-71. Kim was born born to Kim Hyng-jik and Kang Pan-sk. They earlier bestowedupon him the name of Kim Sng-ju, however, he later changed his name to KimIl-Sung. Unsurprisingly, the Kim family, like an copiousness of Korean families, were opposed to the Japanese occupation of theKorea, which began on 29 August 1910.41Kims parents, especially Kims mother, is said to have played a role in theanti-Japanese struggle that was sweeping the peninsula.42This is suggested to be where Kim Il-Sungs anti-imperialism attitudeoriginates. In October 1926 Kim founded the Down-With-Imperialism Union43,in order to fight against Japanese imperialism and to promote Marxism-Leninism44.As previously mention ed, both Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee wanted toreunify Korea on their own terms, however neither side could unify Korea ontheir own due to wishing of strength and supplies. Kim understood that his goals of reunification would require help fromanother communists patron, namely the Soviet Union or China. This suggeststhat Kim knew he didnt have the army or the weapons that he needed to beginthe war himself, he knew he needed support from elsewhere.With this growth of the North Korean army in mind, Kimrenewed his request to unify Korea with Stalin. One likely reason that Kimrenewed his efforts at this time was that since June 29, 1949, the Americanmilitary had retire troops from South Korea.45 Kim wasconvinced that the U.S. would not enter the Korean War, or even if they didenter the war, they would not hold sway over the emergency of the war.46 Kim hadlittle concern if the South had the support of the US as he doubted the have-to doe withof their influence. Stalin ultimately conte mplated the request from Kim tobegin the war for approximately a year, even though he did say no severaltimes, he did eventually approve the proposal.47Conclusion The role of individuals in the causes of the Korean War areessentially insignificant. Ultimately, the Korean War wouldnt have occurred without the divisionof Korea, after the Japanese occupation, decided at the Potsdam conference. Butthis decision wasnt made by one person, it was made by the three super powers,Stalin, Churchill and Truman. But then, the war also wouldnt have occurred if Stalinand the Soviets hadnt constitute Kim Il-Sung as the leader of the north as hewas the one who thought of invading to conquer the south. Mao was influenced byStalin to participate in the war, therefore Chinas input was down to Stalin. Stalinsinfluence was puissant as Kim didnt have the army, weapons or supplies to beat war for 3 years. This proves that it wasnt just the work of one influence, theseput unneurotic influenced the beginn ing of the Korean War.To answer the question of to what extentwas Stalins policy the principle cause of the Korean War (1950-53)?, Stalinhad an obviously large impact on the initiation of the Korean War. 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